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NORMALIZING MATCH RIGHTS 
 
Brian JM Quinn* 
   
 
Early in October of this year the Chancery Court handed down its opinion in In 
re Cogent, Inc. Shareholder Litigation.1 In many respects, the ruling was 
pedestrian. Shareholders of Cogent, a Delaware corporation in the business of 
providing automated fingerprint identification systems, challenged management’s 
decision to sell the corporation to the 3M Company for $10.50/share in cash.2 The 
essence of the shareholders’ challenge focused on supposed inadequacies in the 
sales process that, according to the plaintiffs, resulted in a breach of the directors’ 
Revlon obligations.3 The shareholders further alleged that deal protections and 
other provisions in the merger agreement were preclusive, arguing that such 
provisions made it unlikely that a potential bidder lurking on the edges of the 
transaction might come forward.4 
Of course, not every flaw in a company’s sales process necessarily runs afoul of 
Revlon analysis. Rather, courts will make a determination “regarding the adequacy 
of the decisionmaking process employed by the directors,” as well as a 
determination as to the “reasonableness of the directors’ [decisions]” in light of 
information known to them at the time they made those decisions.5 
“Reasonableness” is the touchstone for a court’s review of director decisions under 
Revlon, not perfection.6 Given that standard, it was not surprising that Vice 
Chancellor Parsons ruled, at the preliminary injunction stage, that the plaintiff 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Thanks to Joel Friedlander and Michael Klausner for 
their insights on the question of matching rights. Thanks also to Elizabeth Johnston (BCLS, ’11) for her editorial 
assistance. 
1 __ A.3d __, No. 5780-VCP, 2010 WL 4491331 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2010). 
2 Id. at *1. 
3 Id. at *5. 
4 Id. 
5 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994). 
6 Id. 
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shareholders did not have a reasonable probability of success on the merits, thereby 
declining to prevent the transaction from moving forward.7 
What is more remarkable about the recent Cogent opinion is the extent to which 
the Chancery Court accepts, without much of a critical eye, the use of matching 
rights in merger agreements that implicate Revlon duties. Matching rights permit 
the bidder who holds them to preempt any subsequent, higher bid and step into the 
second bidder’s shoes. These rights come in many forms. Explicit, or formal, 
matching rights require that the seller engage in good faith negotiations with the 
initial bidder upon receipt of a second bid for a period of time to allow the initial 
bidder to meet the higher, subsequent bid. Less formal matching rights simply buy 
the initial bidder time and information about the second bid, during which time the 
initial bidder can consider whether to make a matching bid or not. To the extent 
that such rights in their various forms work to advantage initial bidders over 
subsequent bidders, their use should at least raise apprehensions under Revlon, 
precisely because Revlon was animated by the court’s concern that directors treat 
second bidders fairly. Instead, beginning with In re Toys “R” Us Shareholder 
Litigation8 in 2005, the Chancery Court institutionalized what can only be 
understood as a per se acceptance of matching rights in merger agreements.9 
The Chancery Court regularly eschews the adoption of bright-line rules in favor 
of highly contextualized, fact-specific analyses of director decisions to agree to 
deal protections in merger agreements. Indeed, the Chancery Court has consistently 
rejected arguments from defendants that deal protection measures, such as 
termination fees, are simply customary deal terms.10 Thus, the court understands 
and acknowledges that, when they are sufficiently large, termination fees can act as 
a deterrent and be unfair to subsequent bidders. In some circumstances, it might be 
unreasonable for Boards to agree to large termination fees and still act in a manner 
consistent with their Revlon duties. While the court has avoided setting out bright-
line rules with respect to termination fees, it has not refrained from looking at such 
fees carefully before passing judgment.11 The same cannot be said of the court’s 
increasingly lax scrutiny of matching rights. 
And this is where the recent Cogent opinion is remarkable. Rather than engage 
in a nuanced analysis of the reasonableness of matching rights within the context 
of each merger agreement, the court has apparently come to accept matching rights 
                                                 
7 In re Cogent, Inc., 2010 WL 4491331 at *22. 
8 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
9 See, e.g., In re 3Com S’holders Litig., No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); In re Lear 
Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, (Del. Ch. 2007); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172 
(Del. Ch. 2007); see also In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., No. 5458-VCS, 2010 WL 3503471 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 
2010).  
10 See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 918 A.2d at 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
11 See id. 
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in their various forms as almost non-negotiable standard terms. Vice Chancellor 
Parsons dealt with matching rights in the agreement, thusly: 
 
After reviewing the arguments and relevant case law, I conclude 
Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed in showing that the no-shop and 
matching rights provisions are unreasonable either separately or in 
combination. Potential suitors often have a legitimate concern that 
they are being used merely to draw others into a bidding war. 
Therefore, in an effort to entice an acquirer to make a strong offer, it is 
reasonable for a seller to provide a buyer some level of assurance that 
he will be given adequate opportunity to buy the seller, even if a 
higher bid later emerges.12 
 
Unlike the Cogent court’s exacting discussion of the appropriateness of the 
termination fee, which included a lengthy discussion of the correct approach to 
calculating such fees,13 the court’s review of the use of matching rights in the 
merger agreement was anything but nuanced. While the courts in In re Dollar 
Thrifty and Toys R Us were ultimately dismissive of the deterrent power of 
matching rights, the court in those cases at least attempted to put matching rights in 
the context of the Board’s considerations. Before Cogent, the court was willing to 
seriously entertain claims that matching rights were unreasonable. The Cogent 
decision suggests the beginnings of a body of case law that treats matching rights 
as a customary term, per se acceptable, and therefore not the proper subject of an 
exacting judicial review. This is unfortunate. 
Unlike discussions of macroeconomic policy, there are no two-handed 
economists when it comes to the incentives generated by matching rights.14 
Matching rights work to deter subsequent bids when held by an initial bidder. In 
the context of common value auctions (e.g., with financial buyers), the effect of a 
matching right is to deter subsequent bidders and appropriate rents to the initial 
bidder. Of course, given that common value buyers place roughly equal value on 
the seller, society is agnostic as to who ultimately wins a bidding contest.15 The 
                                                 
12 In re Cogent, Inc., 2010 WL at 4491331 *9 (internal citation omitted). 
13 Id. at *11. 
14 See, e.g., Sushil Bikchandani, Steven A. Lippman & Reade Ryan, On the Right-of-First-Refusal, 5 ADVANCES 
THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2005); Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?, 99 
AM. ECON. REV. 1544 (2009); Albert H. Choi, A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal, 57 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 252 (2009); Hayley Chouinard, Auctions With and Without Rights of First Refusal and National Park Service 
Concession Contracts, 87 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1082 (2005); A. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and 
Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699, 714 (1987); David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 1 (1999). 
15 See generally Choi, supra note 14. 
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seller’s directors are under an obligation to obtain the highest price reasonably 
available for shareholders, but should not be agnostic to the distribution of the 
surplus created as a result of the transaction. Reasonable boards should not agree to 
transaction mechanisms that systematically result in the distribution of a 
transaction surplus to initial buyers by deterring subsequent buyers with a 
comparable willingness to pay. 
On the other hand, where matching rights are present with private value bidders 
(e.g., strategic acquirers), the presence of the matching right deters subsequent 
bidders from making offers, thus making it possible for lower valuing initial 
bidders to acquire the seller. Such a result is inefficient from a societal standpoint 
and results in systematically lower prices for selling shareholders.16 The economic 
analysis of the effects had by an initial bidder’s matching rights on subsequent 
bidders in both cases is clear: they tend to deter subsequent bids in favor of the 
initial bidder. 
Economic theory suggests that courts should employ a more nuanced and 
serious approach to reviewing the use of matching rights. At the very least, courts 
should subject matching rights to the same level of scrutiny as that applied to 
termination rights. Indeed, there are circumstances—for example, in transactions 
with controlling shareholders—where courts should be quite circumspect of the 
use of such rights. In such circumstances, the presence of matching rights would be 
preclusive of a competitive topping bid. On the other hand, where the directors 
have shopped the company and have negotiated the matching rights for additional 
value from an acquirer, or to end a played out auction, then courts should not stand 
in the way of a well informed Board deciding to accept them. In either situation, 
the court should refrain from treating matching rights as a standard contract term 
that requires little analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Id. 
